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THE NEW BUFFALO: TRIBAL GAMING AS A MEANS 
OF SUBSISTENCE UNDER ATTACK 
Amy L. Cox* 
INTRODUCTION 
The dire economic situation of most Native American tribes! is 
undisputed.2 Even in New Mexico, a state burdened poverty, Ameri-
can Indians traditionally have been among the poorest of the poor.3 
In an effort to improve their financial situation, tribes in New 
Mexico sought to open high-stakes gaming casinos on their respective 
reservations.4 Federal law requires tribes interested in offering high-
stakes gaming to obtain a tribal-state compact detailing the manner 
in which such gaming will be conducted.5 In light of this requirement, 
several New Mexico peublos executed compacts with New Mexico 
Governor Gary Johnson.6 
In 1996, nine of these pueblos appeared before the United States 
District Court for the district of New Mexico.7 The tribes sought to 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-9S. 
1 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (1994) (definition of "Indian 
tribe"). For purposes of this Comment, words such as "tribe," "Indian tribe," "Indian lands," 
etc. are used in the manner defined by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. See generally id. 
2 See George W. Hyde III, The Indian Gaming Regulatary Act of 1988: Did Congress Forget 
About the Other Commerce Clause?, 10 T.M. COOLEY L. REV., 665, 665-66 (1993); Douglas Holt, 
High-Stakes Hand: New Mexico's Fight Over Indian-run Casinos Involves Jobs, Old Griev-
ances, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 1997, at 43A; Tina Griego, Indian Wars 1996: Tribes 
Battle Federal Ruling Declaring Casinos Illegal in New Mexico, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 20, 
1996, at SA; Gwen Florio, New Mexican Indians See Gambling Dispute as Betrayal, PORTLAND 
OREGONIAN, July 25, 1996, at All. 
3 See Griego, supra note 2, at SA. 
4 See Florio, supra note 2, at All. 
525 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994). 
6 See generally Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.N .M. 1996), afl'd, 104 
F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, llS S. Ct. 45 (1997); see, e.g., Holt, supra note 2, at 43A. 
7 See generally Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1284. 
863 
864 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:863 
determine the validity of the compacts executed by Governor J ohn-
son.8 The district court agreed with an earlier ruling of the New 
Mexico Supreme Court holding that the state legislature, not the 
governor, possessed the authority to enter into the compacts at issue.9 
The district court further concluded that no subsequent action or 
event cured the invalidity of the tribal-state compacts.10 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court's decision.ll 
As a result of these decisions, the tribes turned to the New Mexico 
legislature and renewed their attempts to obtain the required com-
pact.12 Well before the federal courts announced their respective de-
cisions, however, the state legislature consistently indicated its un-
willingness to discuss tribal-state compact negotiations. IS The position 
of the New Mexico legislature on compact negotiations and on Indian 
gaming in general made it highly unlikely that the state would volun-
tarily enter into good faith negotiations regarding the required com-
pact.14 
Until recently, the pueblos could have procured the assistance of a 
federal court in obtaining a tribal-state compact.15 Under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, the major federal legislation governing tribal 
gaming, tribes can file an action in federal court to compel a state to 
negotiate a compact in good faith. 16 The 1996 decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, how-
ever, eliminates this option by holding that the Eleventh Amendment 
renders states immune to such actions unless they have consented to 
the jurisdiction of a federal court.17 Because the lawful operation of 
high-stakes gaming requires a tribal-state compact, the Supreme 
8 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1548; Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1290-91. 
9 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1294-95; Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 26-27 (N .M. 
1995). 
10 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1293. 
II See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1559 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 45 (1997). 
12 Tribe Says NM Stands to Lose Out on Casino Money, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 10, 
1996, at 31A. 
13 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1549-50; Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Panel Hears 
Arguments in Suit Filed over NM Indian Gambling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 21, 1996, 
at 26A [hereinafter Panel]; Griego, supra note 2, at 8A. 
14 See Holt, supra note 2, at 43A. 
15 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), (B) (1994). 
16Id. 
17 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 76 (1996). Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida renders states immune to suits by private parties if the state did not consent to being 
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Court's ruling essentially gives states veto power over Indian gam-
ing.18 
This concentration of power in the hands of the state is of special 
concern to the Sandia Pueblo, a tribe that opened the doors of its New 
Mexico gaming establishment in 1986, but who now must close those 
doors in response to the Tenth Circuit's decision.19 Like many Native 
American tribes, the Sandia Pueblo commenced its gaming operations 
well before Congress created the compact requirement in the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act.20 Because the states played no role in regu-
lating gaming conducted on tribal lands prior to this enactment, these 
tribes opened high-stakes gaming establishments without a tribal-
state compact.21 For these tribes, a state's refusal to negotiate effec-
tively criminalizes the continued operation of their high-stakes gam-
ing facilities.22 In so doing, the state's refusal to negotiate frustrates 
the tribes' hopes of earning big returns on what in most cases is 
a significant investment.23 Because states do not compensate these 
tribes for the economic impact of refusing to negotiate, the states may 
be effecting a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.24 
This Comment explores the potential for a Native American tribe 
to bring a regulatory takings challenge against a state for its refusal 
to negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith. Discussion will be 
limited to those tribes that invested in and commenced high-stakes 
gaming operations before Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regu-
sued. Because a tribe may still use the tribal-suit provision to sue a state that consented, the 
provision remains part of the IGRA. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), (B). 
18 See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1297 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1546 
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 45 (1997); Panel, supra note 13, at 26A. 
19 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1549; Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1286. 
20 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1549; Eric D. Jones, The Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act: A Forum for Conflict Among the Plenary PfYWer of Congress, 1Wbal Sovereignty, and the 
Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REV. 127, 131 (1993); Susan Voyles, GANNET NEWS SERV., May 
12, 1987 (page unavail.). Approximately 100 tribes operated bingo establishments by 1988, most 
offering high-stakes bingo with cars, boats and prize money up to $1 million a night. During the 
mid-eighties many more tribes opened or expanded high-stakes gaming. See Jones, supra at 
131; Voyles, supra. 
21 See Jones, supra note 20, at 129 (prior to Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, "states were 
powerless to regulate reservation gaming"). 
22 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1552 ("Failure to comply with anyone of the three 
conditions means the Class III gaming is subject to applicable criminal statutes."). 
23Id. at 1550 n.6 (describing tribes' investments in gaming facilities). See also Holt, supra 
note 2, at 43A; Deborah Baker, 1Wbal Casinos in Controversy, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 7, 
1996, at HI; Mescalero Casino Forced to Close Down, INT'L. GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Nov. 
1, 1996, at 65 [hereinafter Mescalero Casino]. 
24 See U.S. CONST. amend V. 
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latory Act.25 Section I will detail this federal legislation, focusing 
specifically on the provisions that relate to high-stakes gaming. Sec-
tion II will review the evolution of regulatory takings jurisprudence, 
explaining the current tests for determining whether the impact of 
the government action rises to the level of a taking. Section III will 
explain how a regulatory takings analysis would function in the con-
text of tribal gaming, using a regulatory takings claim brought by a 
hypothetical New Mexico tribe to demonstrate the manner in which 
the analysis would operate. Section III will also identify an analogous 
situation that has produced successful Fifth Amendment challenges. 
The Comment will conclude by explaining the importance of tribal 
gaming to Native American tribes and will review the proposed solu-
tion to the tribes' current dilemma. 
1. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
A. An Introduction 
Prior to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, no regulatory frame-
work existed expressly to govern gaming conducted on tribal reser-
vations.26 Though some statutes granted the federal government lim-
ited control over Indian gaming, this control was indirect at best.27 A 
1987 Supreme Court decision rendered the states without authority 
to regulate tribal gaming, though states could prohibit it if every kind 
of gambling was illegal in the state.28 Because most states permitted 
gambling in some limited instances, there were few states in which 
tribal gaming was illega1.29 As a result, the number of tribal gaming 
enterprises increased dramatically and by 1988, at least one hundred 
tribes operated gaming establishments.3o 
In response to the explosion in the number of tribes opening high-
stakes gaming facilities during the 1980s and the decided lack of a 
25 For reasons discussed infra, a tribe that began gaming operations after Congress passed 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act would likely be precluded from mounting a successful Fifth 
Amendment challenge since the regulatory scheme created by the Act existed at the time of 
the tribe's investment in the gaming facility. 
26 See Peter T. Glimco, The IGRA and the Eleventh Amendment: Indian Tribes Are Gambling 
When They 'Pry to Sue a State, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 206 (1993); Jones, supra note 20, 
at 129. 
27 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994); Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994). 
Section III, infra, discusses 25 U.S.C. § 81 in greater detail. 
28 See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987). 
Section III, infra, discusses California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in greater detail. 
29 See Jones, supra note 20, at 131. 
30 See id. 
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regulatory framework to govern their activities, Congress passed the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA, the Act).31 The Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act sought to balance the pro-gaming interests of the fed-
eral government and of the tribes against the interests of the states 
in controlling the nature of high-stakes gaming conducted within their 
borders.32 The Act's provisions, along with its legislative history dem-
onstrate this desire to strike a balance acceptable to all parties in 
interest.33 
1. The National Indian Gaming Commission 
One feature of the Act that demonstrates this attempted balance is 
the creation of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC, the 
Commission) to oversee Indian gaming.34 The Act requires the inclu-
sion of two Native Americans among the Commission's three full-time 
members.35 The NIGC allows federal oversight over such aspects of 
gaming as the gaming itself, the parties involved, and the accounting 
procedures.36 More importantly, through the NIGC, the federal gov-
ernment also approves tribal ordinances related to gaming, as well as 
the required tribal-state compacts.37 The responsibilities and compo-
sition of the NIGC ensure that every gaming establishment is a 
cooperative effort between federal, state, and tribal officials.3s 
2. Three Classes of Gaming 
Another feature of the Act that demonstrates Congress's desire to 
balance the various interests involved in gaming is the division of 
games into three categories.39 Games are separated into classes, noted 
31 Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1546 
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997); see 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994); Jones, supra note 
20, at 131, 133; Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin DiGregory before the 
United States Senate Committee on Indian Mfairs, Oct. 2, 1996 (available in Westlaw - 1996 
WL 13104284) [hereinafter DiGregory Statement]. 
32 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289; Jones, supra note 20, at 132. 
33 Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289; see Jones, supra note 20, at 132; see generally 
25 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2704, 2706, 2710 (1994). 
34 See 25 U.S.C. § 2704. 
35 See id. 
36 See 25 U.S.C. § 2706. 
37 See id. 
38 See generally id. 
39 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 50; see generally 25 U.S.C. § 2703 
(1994). 
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as Class I, Class II, and Class III, respectively.40 Each class of games 
has a varying degree of tribal, state, and federal control.41 
Class I games are within the exclusive control of the tribe.42 Class 
I includes social games played for prizes of minimal value or tradi-
tional Indian games engaged in as part of tribal ceremonies.43 
The tribe and the federal government share control over Class II 
gaming.44 The Act allows Class II gaming if two requirements are 
satisfied.45 The first condition requires that the Indian lands on which 
the gaming will occur be located in a state which "permits such 
gaming for any purpose by any person."46 The second imperative 
requires the tribe to conduct gaming pursuant to an ordinance prop-
erly adopted by the tribe and properly approved by the NIGC.47 
Electronic bingo, non-electronic bingo, and certain card games fall 
within the province of Class II gaming.43 
Class III gaming refers to high-stakes gaming such as roulette, 
craps, and other casino style games; keno; slot machines; electronic 
versions of any game of chance; pari-mutuel wagers on horse racing, 
dog racing, or jai alai; and lotteries.49 Class III gaming is the only 
category which allows-indeed requires-state involvement in shap-
ing the character of Indian gaming. 50 As such, it is the only category 
that is significantly affected by the Supreme Court's ruling in Semi-
nole Tribe.51 For this reason, it is the exclusive focus of this Comment. 
40 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2703. 
41 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 50-51; Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 
(D.N .M. 1996), afl'd, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997); see generally 
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994). 
42 Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289; see 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). 
43 Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289; see 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). 
44 Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 15 (N.M. 1995); see generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b). 
45 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (B). 
46 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A). See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289. Courts have 
construed this requirement in a manner similar to the construction given Public Law 280 in 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). See infra notes 322-34 
and accompanying text. If a state permits Class II gaming for any purpose at all, even in very 
limited exceptions, a tribe will be able to conduct similar games on its reservation. See Jones, 
supra note 20, at 132. 
47 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B). 
48 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1994); Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289. 
49 Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1289-90. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). 
50 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (no state involvement) and § 2710(b) (same), with 
§ 2710(d)(1)(C) (requiring tribal-state compact). 
61 See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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B. High Stakes Gaming Under the IGRA 
Under the IGRA, the prerequisites for lawful Class III gaming are 
similar to those set out for Class II gaming. 52 Both must be conducted 
in a state that "permits such gaming for any purpose and by any per-
son."53 Both must also be conducted pursuant to a properly adopted 
and approved tribal ordinance.54 The similarity stops there, as the 
IGRA adds a third requirement for Class III gaming.55 The lawful 
conduct of high-stakes gaming requires a tribal-state compact that 
governs the gaming activity offered on a particular reservation.56 
In general, the compact requirement applies to all types of Class 
III gaming activity. 57 The IGRA does, however, have several excep-
tions that grant tribes some reprieve from the Act's compact require-
ment.56 For instance, the IGRA contains a grandfather clause that 
applies to non-banking card games operated by tribes in Michigan, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington.59 Tribes in these states 
offering non-banking card games that would, absent the grandfather 
clause, fall within the definition of Class III games need not obtain a 
tribal-state compact because their gaming activity is expressly de-
fined as Class II gaming.60 The IGRA also contains two amortization-
like provisions that provide limited and temporary relief from the 
Act's compact requirement.61 These provisions provide a grace period 
in which tribes that had no tribal-state compact could operate slot 
machines and electronic games of chance, as well as offer certain card 
games, provided that the tribes request that the state make a good 
faith effort to engage in compact negotiations.62 
The limited protection these provisions provide, however, excludes 
the gaming activity of many tribes.63 The grandfather provision, for 
52 Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1290. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A}-(C). 
63 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (Class III gaming), with § 2710(b)(1)(A) (same require-
ment for Class II gaming). 
54 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A) (NIGC approval in Class III gaming), with 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(1)(B) (NIGC approval in Class II gaming). 
65 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). 
66 See id. 
57 See generally id. 
68 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2703(C}-(E) (1994). 
59 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(C); United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 
36O--Q3 (8th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the grandfather clause including some legislative 
history, see United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d at 36O--Q3. 
60 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(C)(i); Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d at 360. 
61 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(D), (E). 
62 See id. 
63 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(C)-(E). 
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example, has obvious geographic limitations.64 It also excludes popular 
banking card games such as baccarat, chemin de fer, and blackjack.65 
The protection afforded by the amortization provisions similarly is of 
little assistance to most tribes since the provisions apply to only select 
games.66 Moreover, all one year grace periods have now expired.67 
1. The Compact Procedure 
The IGRA sets out a specific procedure for tribes interested in 
obtaining the compact necessary for high-stakes gaming.68 The com-
pact requirement dictates that any tribe conducting or wishing to 
conduct Class III gaming on its lands must ask the state in which the 
lands are located to negotiate a tribal-state compact that will govern 
the conduct of gaming activities.69 Upon receiving such a request, the 
state must negotiate in good faith with the tribe to enter into such a 
compact.70 
If a state refuses to negotiate with a tribe in good faith, the Gaming 
Act authorizes the tribe to bring an action against the state in federal 
court.71 Once the tribe makes the requisite showings and the court has 
considered the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial in-
tegrity, and adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities, 
the IGRA requires a federal district court to order the state and 
Indian tribe to conclude a compact within a sixty day period.72 If 
efforts by the district court to require cooperation from the recalci-
trant state fail, the tribe could eventually take its problem to a federal 
mediator.73 The Act allows a federal mediator to select a compact from 
the proposals suggested by the tribe and the state.74 Should the state 
reject that proposal, the Act requires the mediator to notify the 
Secretary of the Interior, who would then prescribe procedures con-
sistent with the proposed compact.75 The language of the Act seems 
64 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(C). 
65 See id. 
66 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(D), (E). 
67 See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(D), (E); see also Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1552 
(1Oth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997). 
68 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1994). 
69 25 U.S.C § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
70 [d. 
71 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), (B). 
72 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii), (iii). 
73 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). 
74 [d. 
76 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii). 
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to imply that each step in this framework is contingent upon the 
tribe's ability to obtain a court order requiring the state to conclude 
a compact.76 
With the 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe, the United States Su-
preme Court struck a significant blow to this framework.77 Seminole 
Tribe declared unconstitutional the provision of the IGRA authorizing 
tribes to sue states that refused to comply with the Act's good faith 
negotiation obligation.78 In reaching this holding, the Court acknow-
ledged that the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress great law 
making authority in Indian affairs.79 The Court further determined 
that, in enacting the IGRA, Congress's intent to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity was "unmistakably clear."so The Court concluded, 
however, that Congress could not constitutionally abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
Clause.81 As the Court explained, "[e]ven when the Constitution vests 
in Congress complete law-making power in a particular area, the 
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits 
by private parties against unconsenting states."82 
This decision, which effectively immunizes states from suit, has a 
significant effect on Indian tribes.83 Seminole Tribe altered the balance 
76 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(vii). For example, the Act does not contemplate 
the involvement of a federal mediator until the sixty day period provided in the court order 
expires. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). 
77 See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
78 See id. at 72-73. 
79 See id. at 62. 
80 See id. at 56-57. 
81 See id. at 72-73. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court overruled the earlier 
precedent of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). In Union Gas, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Congress could abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states when 
acting pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5. The Native 
American tribes involved in Seminole Tribe relied on this precedent to argue that the abrogation 
effected by the IGRA was constitutional. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61--ti2. The tribes 
reasoned that the Interstate Commerce Clause granted Congress plenary power over interstate 
commerce, but it left the states with some power to regulate interstate commerce. [d. at 60. In 
contrast, the Indian Commerce Clause makes "Indian relations ... the exclusive province of 
federal law" and provides the state with no residual power. [d. (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida 
Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1994». Essentially, the tribes argued that Congress 
must be able to abrogate sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
Clause since it can abrogate sovereign immunity under the (comparatively) more limited Inter-
state Commerce Clause. See id. at 62--ti7. The Seminole Tribe Court found this reasoning 
persuasive, but then proceeded to dismantle the Union Gas opinion that provided the basis for 
this argument. [d. at 62--ti7. 
82 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. 
sa See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1297 (D.N .M. 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1546 
(lOth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997). 
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of power between the states and Native American tribes in a manner 
that does not reflect the Congressional goals behind the IGRA.84 By 
stripping Native American tribes of a weapon needed to avail them-
selves of federal assistance in procuring states' cooperation, the deci-
sion allows states to undermine tribal efforts to obtain tribal-state 
compacts simply by ignoring their legal duty to negotiate in good 
faith.85 After Seminole Tribe, states can refuse to negotiate a compact 
in complete and utter bad faith, and can do so with impunity.86 In 
essentially granting the states "veto power" of Indian gaming, the 
Seminole Tribe decision makes clearer the substantial burden Con-
gress imposed on tribes when it created the tribal-state compact 
requirement.87 
2. Effects of the IGRA's Compact Requirement 
In assessing this burden, it must be noted that the first two require-
ments for Class III gaming do not seem to present a drastic departure 
from pre-IGRA law.88 As to the first condition, the operation of Indian 
gaming has always been predicated on the notion that a state that 
prohibited gaming of any kind could also prohibit Indian gaming.89 
Similarly, the provision requiring federal approval of tribal ordinances 
related to gaming also does not present an entirely new idea to Indian 
gaming.90 
84 See id; Jones, 8Upra note 20, at 171. 
85 See Jones, BUpra note 20, at 171; Bee generally Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932. F. Supp. at 1297. 
86 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73, n.16; [d. 75--76. Justice Scalia suggests that Ex Parte 
Young, a doctrine that allows private parties to sue state officials, may still provide a remedy 
for the states' refusal to negotiate. See id. at 73 n.16. Yet the Court later holds that Ex Parte 
Young is not a viable remedy for tribes dealing with uncooperative states. See id. at 75-76. 
87 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932. F. Supp. at 1297; Bee generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(C) 
(1994). 
88 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(B) (must be conducted in state that permits such gaming 
by any person for any purpose) and 25 U.S.C. § 271O(d)(I)(A) (requiring federal approval of 
tribal ordinance), with California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209-11 (1987) 
(state law can prohibit Indian gaming if law prohibits gaming by all persons for any purpose) 
and 25 U .S.C. § 81 (1994) (requiring federal approval of gaming management contracts if they 
relate to Indian land). 
89 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 209-11 (1987) (state law can prohibit Indian gaming if law 
prohibits gaming by all persons for any purpose); Jones, BUpra note 20, at 132. 
90 Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(A) (requiring NIGC approval) with 25 U.S.C. § 81 (requir-
ing approval of the Secretary of the Interior for contracts related to Indian land). The require-
ment that a tribal ordinance authorizing gaming be subject to final approval by the Chairperson 
of the NIGC resembles the control held by the Secretary of the Interior prior to the enactment 
of the IGRA. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(A); 25 U.S.C. § 81. Courts have held that in 
most circumstances, Section 81 requires the Secretary's approval for management contracts 
associated with Indian gaming facilities. See generally Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band 
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In contrast to the relatively minor changes these two IGRA provi-
sions introduced to Indian gaming, the notion that Class III gaming 
requires a tribal-state compact represents a major change in the law.91 
Due to the status of Native American tribes as a sovereign nation 
subject only to the control of the federal government, the federal 
government is said to have plenary power over Indian affairs.92 While 
this plenary power does not indicate that the federal government has 
absolute control, it does indicate that federal authority over Indian 
tribes is construed broadly.93 As a result, states traditionally have had 
very limited control of Indian affairs.94 In granting states the power 
to significantly influence an activity as important to tribes as high-
stakes gaming, Congress immensely changed the role of the states in 
Indian affairs. 
The requirement of state involvement via the tribal-state compact-
introduced a new player into the world of Indian gaming.96 This 
player's interests are often contrary to those of the federal govern-
ment and the tribe itself.96 Whereas the federal government and the 
tribes seek to foster gaming as a major step toward economic and 
political self-sufficiency,97 states fear the social evils that sometimes 
accompany the operation of a casino and often view casinos as a threat 
to other state businesses.98 The legislative history of the IGRA indi-
cates that the compact provision was viewed as a compromise that 
of Mission Indians v. American Management & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987); 
see, e.g., A.K. Management Co. v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 
1986); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Enterprise Management Consult-
ants, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Okla. 1990). Morever, federal oversight is fairly common in 
Indian affairs as part of the unique trust relationship and the tribes' status as dependent 
sovereigns. See Amber J. Ahola, "Call It Revenge of the Pequots," or Huw American Indian 
Tribes Can Sue States Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Without Violating the Elev-
enth Amendment, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 915 (l993) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831». 
91 See Jones, supra note 20, at 129. 
92 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville 
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980), United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975». 
93 See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
94 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 214; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 
164,170--71 (1973); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 
104 F.3d 1456 (lOth Cir. 1996), em. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997). 
96 See Jones, supra note 20, at 129 (no state involvement prior to IGRA). 
96 See T. Barton French, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the Eleventh Amendment: 
States Assert Sovereign Immunity Defense to Sluw the Growth of Indian Gaming, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 735, 747 (1993). 
97 See id. at 744-46. 
98 See id. at 747; Louis Jacobson, Are Tribal Gaming Halls a Good Bet?, NATL J., Dec. 21, 
1996 (page unavail.). 
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allowed two equal sovereigns to negotiate the problems presented by 
competing interests rather than have the federal government legis-
late a solution.99 This compromise assumed that states would be will-
ing to negotiate such problems with tribes, an assumption that some 
observers feel was naive.1OO 
Regardless of whether or not Congress anticipated the antipathy 
of states toward Indian gaming, the source of this hostility seems to 
be the public's own aversion to high-stakes gambling on Native Amer-
ican lands.lol In many states, voters rejected gaming proposals in 
1994.1<12 Gaming proposals on the ballot in 1996 met a similar fate. lOO 
The reasons behind the public's opposition to gaming range from fear 
of increased crime, to the deleterious effect gaming may have on the 
moral fiber of the surrounding moral community, to concerns about 
the effect of gaming on other businesses.104 
With public sentiment so opposed to Indian gaming, states have 
little incentive to enter into negotiations for gaming compacts. lOS The 
amount of litigation and media attention surrounding attempts at 
tribal state compacts and the fact that many negotiations continue for 
years indicate that obtaining state approval is no easy feat.106 For 
many tribes, the tribal suit provision in the IGRA offered the only 
hope of enforcing the Act's imperative for the states to negotiate a 
compact in good faith.l07 
Procuring the state's cooperation without the assistance of the 
federal government presents a dilemma for tribes seeking to establish 
future gaming operations, to be sure.lOO But the application of the Act's 
tribal-state compact requirement to tribes that operated gaming en-
99 See Jones, supra note 20, at 134. The legislative history also indicates that Congress may 
not have anticipated the states' resistance to Native American gaming. See id. 
100 See Hyde, supra note 2, at 693. 
101 See Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.). 
102 See id. 
lOll See id. 
104 See Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.). Some economists 
and developers refer to casinos as "economic black holes" that cannibalize a state's other tourist 
businesses. See Griego, supra note 2, at 8A. 
106 See Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.). 
106 See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (litigation involving 
compact); Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1993) (same); Sault 
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (same); 
Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (same); Poarch 
Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (same). 
10'7 See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp.l284, 1297 (D.N.M.1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1456 
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997). 
lOll See generally id. 
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terprises prior to the IGRA's enactment sounds the death-knell for 
the on-going gaming activity of many tribes.109 Unless they can obtain 
a tribal-state compact authorizing high-stakes gaming, the gaming 
activity of many tribes-legal prior to the IGRA-will be unlawful.UO 
A tribe in this situation must close the doors of its casino or face 
criminal prosecution.111 For tribes that commenced gaming operations 
prior to the IGRA's enactment, this not only means the elimination of 
future income, but also the present destruction and diminution of the 
value of some tribal property.U2 A state's refusal to honor its legal 
duty to negotiate a compact in good faith effectively ''takes'' the value 
of the tribe's property, potentially violating the Fifth Amendment's 
proscription on governmental takings of private property.U3 If the 
state's refusal constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment, 
Native American tribes possess another potential weapon to employ 
in attempts to obtain a tribal-state compact: a suit against a state for 
a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
II. REGULATORY TAKINGS 
A. Introduction to Fifth Amendment Takings Law 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from taking private property for public use without just com-
pensation.U4 Though this proscription is directed at the federal gov-
ernment, the Fourteenth Amendment makes the prohibition against 
government takings applicable to the states.U5 
Courts have long distinguished between governmental takings that 
involve a permanent physical invasion or appropriation of private 
property and those in which a particular regulatory scheme so im-
pedes the use of private property that the situation amounts to a 
taking.u6 Government action that results in a permanent physical 
109 See Florio, supra note 2, at All; see generally Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1552, 1558. 
llO See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1552 (Failure to comply subjects the gaming to 
applicable criminal statutes). 
III See id.; see also Mescalero Casino, supra note 23 at 65. 
112 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1550 n.6 (describing losses to various tribes, no figures 
are listed for the Sandia Pueblo, but it seems reasonable assume sample provided by the court 
is representative; see also Baker, supra note 23, at HI; Mescalero Casino, supra note 23, at 65. 
ll3 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
ll4 See id. 
116 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978). 
ll6 See Geoffrey L. Harrison, The Endangered Species Act and Ursine Usurpations: A Grizzly 
7hle of Two 7hkings, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1109 (1991). 
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invasion of private property constitutes a compensable taking per 
se.ll7 Since neither the IGRA, the decision in Seminole Tribe, nor a 
state's refusal to negotiate a compact involve physical invasions or 
appropriations of tribal property, this Comment discusses only prin-
ciples of regulatory takings. 
While government action that effects a physical taking impacts 
private property directly, regulatory takings affect the uses of prop-
erty, not the property itself,11s Since Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
courts have realized that a regulation may result in a taking of prop-
erty if that regulation goes ''too far."ll9 This acknowledgment provided 
the impetus for the law of regulatory takings.12o 
Ascertaining whether a particular government action rises to the 
level of a regulatory taking requires a court to make two determina-
tions.121 A court must first conclude that the government's action 
affects cognizable property interests.l22 Second, the court must then 
determine that the state's action so significantly affects these inter-
ests that the government has in effect "taken" the property inter-
ests.l23 These determinations will be addressed in turn. 
B. Cognizable Property Interests 
The Fifth Amendment does not protect every property interest.l24 
Consequently, in any claim alleging a governmental taking of private 
property, a court must ask the ''logically antecedent question" of 
whether the affected property interest is among the "sticks" in the 
''bundle of rights" deserving of Fifth Amendment protection.126 A 
survey of cases indicates a pattern of patchwork decisions by the 
117 Id. at 1109-10; see Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982). 
118 Compare Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16 (two silver boxes and wire occupying approximately 
one and one half cubic feet of space), with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1008-00 (1992) Oegislation preventing claimant from building permanent structure on 
beachfront lot). 
119 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
120 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014. 
121 See Peter L. Henderer, The Inpact [sic] of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and 
the Logically Antecedent Question: A Practitioner's Guide to Fifth Amendment Thkings of 
Wetlands, 3 ENVTL. L. 407, 414-15, 435 (1997). 
122 See id. at 414-15. 
128 See id. at 415. 
124 See id. at 414-15 (quoting M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 30 Fed. CI. 360, 367 (1994»; 
Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Thking?, C226 ALI-ABA 
219,228 (1988); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
125 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Henderer, supra note 121, at 414-15. 
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courts that provide a general framework for determining whether a 
particular property interest qualifies for constitutional protection. 
Within this framework, courts appear to rely on two theories to 
identify property interests worthy of Fifth Amendment protection, 
here noted as Theory I and Theory II, respectively.126 Whether what 
I have termed Theory I or Theory II applies in any particular case 
depends upon the nature of the interest affected by the government 
action. If the interests affected are fundamental to the traditional 
concept of property, Theory I will apply.127 If the interests are not 
fundamental, but are sufficiently related to the property owner's rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations, a court may rely on Theory 
II to conclude that a cognizable property interest is at stake.128 Each 
theory is explained below. 
1. Theory I 
The first theory is fairly straightforward. Case law indicates that 
some attributes and uses of property are fundamental to the bundle 
of rights commonly characterized as "property."I29 These attributes 
and uses are protected from excessive governmental intrusion.130 The-
ory I seems to be an objective approach, with the main inquiry focus-
ing on whether the property use at issue falls into the confines of what 
a court considers "fundamental."131 Moreover, these confines appear 
to be very narrow.l32 In only two instances has the United States 
Supreme Court found the existence of cognizable property interests 
when employing the fundamental attributes theory.l33 To date, the 
Supreme Court has limited its interpretation of fundamental attrib-
126 Compare Rodel v. Christy, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1985) (finding cognizable property interest 
where government action affected fundamental element of property rights-Theory 1) and 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (same), with Penn Central, 438 U.S. 
at 124-25 (indicating property interests must be "sufficiently bound up with the reasonable 
expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes" -Theory 
Il). 
127 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
128 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 415. 
129 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
lao See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
131 See generally Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
132 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80; see also Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.s. 51, 654)6 (1979) (indicating right to put propoerty to most profitable use not funda-
mental because its elimination is not "dispositive"). 
133 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
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utes or uses to the right to devise propertyl34 and the right to exclude 
others from property.lS6 
2. Theory II 
In addition to protecting attributes and uses of property deemed 
"fundamental," courts have employed a second theory to identify 
property interests worthy of constitutional protection from govern-
ment actions.lss In contrast to the objective approach of Theory I, this 
theory forces a court to inquire into the property owner's subjec-
tive expectations regarding the use of the property, and then deter-
mine whether those expectations were reasonable.ls7 Under Theory 
II, property interests that sufficiently relate to the primary reason-
able investment-backed expectations of the property owner consti-
tute cognizable property interests.lss 
To determine whether a particular use relates to a property owner's 
"primary" investment-backed expectation (lBE), courts have looked 
to the past and present uses of the property in question.l39 For exam-
ple, in Penn Central Transportation v. New York City, (discussed 
infra) the United States Supreme Court noted that the New York 
City law at issue in the case did not preclude the property's current 
use, but rather allowed the claimants to use the property "precisely 
as it had been used for the past 65 years."l40 Based on this observation, 
and without further explanation, the Court concluded "the law [did] 
not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary 
expectation concerning the use of the parcel."l4l Apparently, the fact 
that a parcel of property is used or has always been used in a manner 
now affected by the challenged law predisposes a court to find that 
134 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715-17. 
135 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179. 
136 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 414-15. 
137 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 
215, 232-33 (1995). 
136 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see Renderer, supra 
note 121, at 414-15. Courts have not provided an explicit definition of investment-backed 
expectations (I BE). See Mandelker, supra note 137, at 249. According to scholars, however, 
IBE's are typically those expectations regarding property use that induced the owner to invest 
in the property. See Renderer, supra note 121, at 415; Mandelker, supra note 124, at 224. In this 
sense, they are, as the term suggests, expectations that are backed by investments. See 
Renderer, supra note 121, at 415; Mandelker, supra note 124, at 224. For an in depth discussion 
of investment-backed expectations, see Mandelker, supra note 137, and Mandelker, supra note 
124. 
139 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
14°Id. 
141Id. 
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the law interferes with the property owner's primary expectations.l42 
The focus on past uses to define "primary" implies that a primary 
expectation arises at the time of the property owner's initial invest-
ment.l43 If this interpretation proves correct, courts will exclude from 
Fifth Amendment protection "new" uses that arise after the time of 
investment. 144 
In addition to finding that a particular use affected by a challenged 
law sufficiently relates to a property owner's primary IBE, a court 
using Theory II to determine whether a claim involves cognizable 
property interests must also conclude that the owner possessed "rea-
sonable" investment-backed expectations.145 Reasonable IBEs "must 
be more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract need."146 Gener-
ally, property owners can demonstrate the reasonableness of their 
expectations by proving that they purchased or invested in the prop-
erty "in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the chal-
lenged regulatory scheme."147 
Even property owners who purchased their property under circum-
stances that indicated a particular use of property might be prohibited 
or subjected to regulation at some time in the future may be found to 
have assumed the "regulatory risk" of investing in the property.l48 For 
instance, in Avenal v. United States, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the claimants did not 
possess reasonable IBE because they knew or should have known 
that their property could be negatively impacted by government 
142 See id. 
143 See Mandelker, supra note 137, at 242-43. 
144 See id. Some state courts appear to have adopted this interpretation of primary expecta-
tion, refusing to protect IBE's that arose after the time of purchase. See generally Department 
of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 1989). 
145 Mandelker, supra note 124, at 232; see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 
(1984) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980»; Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
146 See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 161 (1980». 
147 Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1177. Some scholars suggest this rationale derived from the 
doctrines of estoppel and vested rights. See Mandelker, supra note 124, at 223. These doctrines 
protected landowners from a change in the regulatory scheme if they had made "substantial 
expenditures on a development project in good faith reliance" on government action, or more 
accurately, government inaction. See id. Property owners who purchased or invested with 
knowledge of the offending regulatory scheme either "have no reliance interest, or ... have 
assumed the risk of any economic loss" in the use now impeded by government regulation. See 
Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1177. 
148 See Mandelker, supra note 137, at 233-36; see, e.g., Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d, 933, 
937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (1997). 
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interference at any time.149 In Avenal, discussions of building a fresh-
water diversion project had been on-going for at least ten years prior 
to the claimants' investment in leases for oyster cultivation.l60 The 
Federal Circuit acknowledged that the challenged government action 
reduced the value of the claimants' property ''well beyond the level 
of mere diminution," but declined to find a taking specifically because 
the claimants' expected use of the property was unreasonable in light 
of the anticipated government action.161 Other circumstances that may 
indicate a regulatory risk include a requirement that the owner obtain 
a permit for his or her intended use of the property, or the mere fact 
that the owner purchased the property at a low price.l62 
The reasonableness of a property owner's IBE also depends on the 
legality of the owner's intended use of the property.l63 Courts have 
limited Fifth Amendment protection to lawful uses of property.1M 
Apparently, an investment-backed expectation that involves an illegal 
use of property is an unreasonable expectation.l66 As the United 
States Supreme Court explained in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, uses prohibited by common law nuisance principles and uses 
that did not inhere in the owner's original title cannot form the basis 
of a successful takings claim.l66 The Supreme Court's reasoning in 
support of this proposition closely resembles the logic behind the 
regulatory risk theory described above.167 Because common law nui-
sance or other general property principles tacitly rendered the prop-
erty owner's desired use unlawful prior to the challenged government 
action, "it was open to the State at any point to make the implication 
of those background principles of nuisance and property law explicit" 
by enacting the challenged law or otherwise taking action that ad-
versely affected the claimant's property interests.l68 
149 See Avenal, 100 F.3d at 938. 
160 See id. at 934-36. 
161 See id. at 937-38. 
162 See Renderer, supra note, 121 at 427-28; Mandelker, supra note 137, at 233-36, 247-48. See, 
e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (permit); Ciampitti v. 
United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 313, 321 (1991) (permit); McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. 
Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989) Oow purchase price). 
163 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-30 (1992); Renderer, 
supra note 121, at 415. 
164 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-30. 
166 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 415. 
166 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30. 
157 See id. at 1030; Mandelker, supra note 137, at 233-36. 
168 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (citing Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 RARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1239-41 (1967». 
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Regardless of which theory comes into play, a regulatory takings 
claimant who satisfactorily demonstrates that his or her claim in-
volves cognizable property interests overcomes one of the two neces-
sary hurdles required to prevail on the takings claim.169 The remaining 
challenge involves assessing the effect of the challenged government 
action on the claimant's cognizable property interest.l60 
C. Effect of the Government Action 
The government cannot be required to pay for every reduction in 
value that results from a change in the general law.161 Consequently, 
a plaintiff alleging a regulatory taking must not only demonstrate that 
the challenged government action affects cognizable property inter-
ests, but also that the government action so significantly affects these 
interests that compensation is required. l62 Every takings claim re-
quires this two part analysis.l63 
As regulatory takings jurisprudence evolved, courts have articu-
lated three rules that apply to the second part of the takings analy-
sis.l64 One rule applies to laws that do not substantially advance a 
legitimate public purpose.l66 This rule was explicity announced in 
Agins v. City of Tiburon,l66 but finds its underpinnings in earlier 
cases.167 A second rule applies to cases involving government actions 
that completely destroy all economically productive or beneficial uses 
of the property in question.l68 This rule, expressly stated in Lucas v. 
169 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 414-15; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
160 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 415, 430. 
161 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
162 See Henderer, supra note 121 at 415, 429--30. See also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 
21 CI. Ct. 161, 167 (1990), vacated and remanded, 18 F.3d. 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1109 (1995). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with 
the district court's assessment of the extent to which the permit denial at issue reduced the 
claimant's property value. Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1572-73. The case is cited here only as an 
example of a court first explicitly determining the existence of a cognizable property interest, 
then turning to the economic impact of the regulation. See Florida Rock, 21 CI. Ct. at 167~8. 
163 See Henderer, supra note 121 at 415, 429--30. See also Florida Rock, 21 CI. Ct. at 167. 
164 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (rule for laws 
that do not substantially advance legitimate public purpose and rule for laws that totally destroy 
all economically beneficial or productive uses of property; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (traditional takings rule for laws that diminish value of property 
but do not destroy all economically beneficial uses); Henderer, supra note 121, at 415-16. See 
also Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568 (suggesting existence of partial and total takings rules). 
166 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470,495 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262~3 (1980). 
166 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262~. 
167 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
166 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; see also Henderer, supra note 121, at 415-46. 
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South Carolina Coastal Council/69 is also present to some extent in 
earlier cases.170 A third rule governs situations in which a regulation 
diminishes, but does not destroy the economic value of the property.l71 
Penn Central Transportation v. New York City provided the forum 
for announcing this rule, and its influence can be seen in later cases.172 
Many takings claims require the court to consider first whether the 
second rule, involoving "total takings" applies, and if not, to conduct 
a second inquiry to determine whether the claim constitutes a regu-
latory taking under the traditional rules governing the takings analy-
sis.173 To better illustrate the application of and the purposes behind 
the rules announced in Lucas and in Penn Central, a brief discussion 
of the evolution of regulatory takings jurisprudence is set forth below. 
1. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon 
As noted above, Pennsylvania Coal sparked the birth of regulatory 
takings law.174 The case involved a challenge to an ordinance that 
prevented a coal company from mining all the coal in its property due 
to the threat posed to the safety and property of people living near 
the area.175 For the first time ever, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that legislation enacted pursuant to the broad police power possessed 
by the states must balance both the needs of the community at large 
and those of the individual property owners.176 The Court concluded 
that the legislation at issue failed this balancing test since the chal-
lenged legislation primarily served to protect the private interests of 
homeowners threatened by subsistence mining.177 Because the Su-
preme Court found only a limited public purpose in the challenged act, 
it concluded that enforcement of the legislation required compensa-
tion.178 
169 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016. 
170 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Agins, 447 
U.S. at 262-U3. 
171 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 415-16; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
172 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25; see, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1019 n. 8. 
173 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 415-16. 
174 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). 
175 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. 
176 See id. at 413-14. 
177 See id. at 414, 416. 
178 See id. 
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2. Penn Central Transportation v. New York City 
Penn Central Transportation v. New York City provided more 
assistance in fleshing out Justice Holmes's admonition that a regula-
tion must not go "too far."I79 The Penn Central Court employed a 
three factor test in evaluating a city ordinance that precluded a land-
owner from developing the air space over Grand Central Station.l80 In 
holding that the challenged ordinance did not work an unconstitu-
tional taking, the Court considered the (1) character of the govern-
mental action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant, and (3) the extent to which the regulation interfered with the 
claimant's distinct investment-backed expectations.181 
In considering the character of the governmental action, the Court 
not only sought to characterize the government's action as a physical 
versus regulatory taking, but also to characterize the government 
action as benefiting public interests or private.l82 This reflects Penn-
sylvania Coal's search for a broader public purpose in the challenged 
legislation. I&'! The Court noted that Government action that affects 
property rights must further a general public purpose and not burden 
some property owners disproportionately.l84 
The second factor the Court incorporated in its three pronged test 
required an assessment of the regulation's economic impact on the 
property.l86 In explaining how this factor would be addressed, the 
Court noted that if the regulation allowed an owner- to earn a reason-
able return, it would not constitute a compensable taking.l86 The Court 
did not detail what would qualify as a reasonable return, apparently 
leaving that determination to be made by the lower courtS.187 The 
Court did, however, make clear that a diminution in property value, 
standing alone, does not amount to a taking.l88 The Supreme Court 
also indicated that the extent to which the regulation allowed the 
179 Compare id. at 413-14 (balance test) with Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (three factor test). 
180 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115, 124. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 123 (public), id. at 124 (physical). 
183 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. 
184 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123, 134-35. 
185 See id. at 124. 
186 See id. at 136, 138. 
187 See id. at 136. 
188 See id. at 131. 
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property owner to retain valuable residual rights must be "taken into 
account in considering the impact of a regulation.m89 
As for the third component of the test-interference with the prop-
erty owner's distinct investment-backed expectations-the Court did 
not explain what degree of interference would prompt a court to find 
a taking.1OO In fact, the Court did not even provide an explicit defini-
tion of investment-backed expectations.19l The Penn Central Court 
looked to the past and present uses of Grand Central Station to 
determine "what must be regarded as [the claimant's] primary expec-
tation concerning the use of the parcel."192 The fact that the challenged 
ordinance permitted the claimants to continue using the property 
"precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years," helped the court 
conclude that the challenged ordinace did not interfere with the claim-
ant's primary investment-backed expectations.193 
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon 
Not long after deciding Penn Central, the United States Supreme 
Court heard Agins v. City of Tiburon. 194 Agins presented a takings 
challenge to a zoning ordinance that limited the claimants' construc-
tion on a parcel of property they had hoped to develop.195 In deter-
mining that the ordinance was not, on its face, unconstitutional,196 the 
Supreme Court changed the language describing the factors of the 
traditional takings analysis and collapsed Penn Central's three 
pronged test into a two factor inquiry.197 The Court held that govern-
ment action constitutes a taking if it does not substantially advance 
189 See Penn Central, 505 U.S. at 137. In Penn Central, the Court noted that the New York 
City ordinance challenged in the case not only allowed the claimants "to profit from the Terminal, 
but also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on [the] investment." See id. at 136. The Court further 
concluded that the value of the residual rights the ordinance afforded the claimants ''undoubt-
edly mitigate[d] whatever financial burdens the law imposed" on the claimants. See id. at 137. 
These observations weighed in favor of the constitutionality of the ordinance in question. See 
id. at 136-87. 
190 See generally id. 
191 See generally id. 
192 See id. at 136. 
193 See id. 
194 See generally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
196 See id. at 257-58. 
196 See id. at 260. Because the claimants had not sought the zoning board's approval of their 
development plan, there was not yet a controversy regarding the specific application of the 
zoning provisions. [d. at 260. The only question before the Court was whether the mere 
enactment of the zoning ordinance constituted a taking. [d. 
197 See id.; Penn Central 438 U.S. at 124. 
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legitimate state interests or if it denies an owner all economically 
viable use of the land.19s 
Despite the apparent reformulation of the traditional takings analy-
sis, the factors influencing the Court's decision in Agins seem to 
remain the same as those that prompted the holding of Penn Cen-
tral. l99 For instance, the first criterion in the Agins test requires an 
assessment of the purposes behind the challenged government ac-
tion.200 This mirrors Penn Central's inquiry into the character of the 
government action.20l Both cases implicitly require that the legislation 
substantially advance a public purpose.202 
The second element of the Agins two part test also reflects Penn 
Central's influence on the Agins decision.203 In considering whether 
the regulation destroyed all economically viable uses of the property, 
the Agins Court incorporated both the "economic impact" and the 
"interference with investment backed expectations" aspects of the 
Penn Central standard.204 If a regulation denied a property owner all 
viable use of her property, clearly it would have a significant economic 
impact on the property.205 Further, a denial of all economically viable 
use would seem to constitute a substantial interference with the 
owner's investment backed expectations, simply because it eliminates 
virtually all uses.206 The fact that the Agins Court itself adopted the 
language of Penn Central in noting the extent to which the regulation 
interfered with the claimants' reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations supports the contention that both the second and third Penn 
Central factors are reflected in the second Agins element.207 
198 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
199 See id.; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
200 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
201 See id.; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
413-14 (1922). 
200 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 
U.S. at 413-14. In Agins, the Court found persuasive the determination of the California 
legislature that the zoning ordinance advanced the long recognized legitimate government 
purpose of protecting citizens from the effects of urbanization. See 447 U.S. at 261. 
208 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
204 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
205 See Agins, 438 U.S. 261-62; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25, 136-37. 
206 See generally Agins, 438 U.S. 26Hi2; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25, 136-37. 
20'7 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63. In Agins, the Supreme Court concluded that the property 
retained economically viable uses since the ordinance allowed the property owners to build as 
many as five houses on their property, allowing the claimants to pursue their investment-backed 
expectations. See id. 
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4. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis 
Seven years after the decision in Agins, its two part test still 
appeared to be the starting point for regulatory takings challenges.208 
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Su-
preme Court used the Agins test to decide a case very much like 
Pennsylvania Coal.209 The Court recognized the obvious similarities 
between the two cases, but found differences in critical and disposi-
tive respects.210 Keystone is significant both because it clarified the 
second prong of the Agins test and because it reaffirmed the impor-
tance of the Penn Central factors in a takings analysis. 
In considering the second prong of the Agins inquiry, whether the 
legislation denied all economically viable uses, the Keystone Court 
noted the comparatively minimal effect of the legislation on the prop-
erty in question.211 In fact, the coal company bringing the challenge 
never even claimed that its general operations or even specific mines 
had been unprofitable since the enactment of the challenged statute.212 
This concession effectively foreclosed the ability of the coal company 
to credibly claim that the legislation had denied it all economically 
viable use of its property.213 The Court further concluded that the 
small reduction in profit occasioned by the Subsistence Act did not 
"materially affect" the claimant's investment-backed expectations.214 
208 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Agins, 447 
U.S. at 260. 
209 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 480 (Court agrees facts of Keystone are similar to those of 
Pennsylvania Coal, but distinguished so that Pennsylvania Coal did not control); Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). Like Pennsylvania Coal, Keystone Bituminous involved 
a challenge to an ordinance that prevented a coal company from mining all of the coal from its 
property. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 471; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. As in Pennsylvania 
Coal, mining of the coal in question would jeopardize the safety and homes of people living above 
the area to be mined. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 471; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. 
210 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 481 (noting similarities); id. at 484, 487 (distinguishing). For 
example, in considering the first prong of the Agins test-the nature of the state interests 
advanced by the challenged regulation-the Court distinguished the legislation challenged in 
Keystone from the leglislation challenged in Pennsylvania Coal. See generally id. at 485-93 
(discussion of public purpose). In contrast to the limited public purpose found in Pennsylvania 
Coal, the Keystone Court specifically noted the Pennsylvania legislature's finding that enforce-
ment of the legislation served important public interests. Compare id. at 485, 487 (Legislature's 
findings of public interest) with Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414, 416 (challenged legislation 
is "private benefit statute" protecting private landowners' homes). 
211 See id. at 493-96. 
212 See id. at 496. 
213 See id. at 496-97. 
214 See id. at 499. 
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As it considered the two pieces of the Agins test, the Keystone 
Court also reaffirmed Penn Central's relevance.216 Like the Agins 
Court's inquiry into the purposes served by the challenged ordinance, 
the Keystone Court's requirement that the challenged legislation sub-
stantially advance legitimate government interests mirrors Penn 
Central's focus on the character of the government action.216 Also, 
when the Keystone Court considered whether economically viable 
uses of the property remained, it assessed both the legislation's eco-
nomic impact and the extent to which it interfered with the claimant's 
investment-backed expectations.217 This inclusion again supports the 
contention that the second Agins criterion incorporates factors two 
and three of the Penn Central test.218 
Because both Agins and Keystone demonstrate the continued im-
portance of the Penn Central factors, one might wonder why the 
Supreme Court endeavored to modify the traditional framework at 
all. The significance of the Court's modification became more apparent 
in the Lucas decision.219 
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council involved a challenge to 
South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act (the Management 
Act).220 As it applied to the claimant, the Management Act prevented 
the construction of any permanent structure on two lots he had pur-
chased in hopes of developing them into single family residences.221 
The state court found that the property had no remaining economic 
value, but dismissed the takings claim because the legislation ad-
vanced a legitimate government purpose.222 
216 See generally Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-97. 
216 See id. at 485; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 
(1922). 
217 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495-96, 499. 
218 See id. at 495-96, 499; Agins, 447 U.S. at 262; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
219 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
220 See id. at 1007-10. 
221 See id. at 1009 (citing trial court's finding). 
222 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991). The United 
States Supreme Court, while acknowledging the importance of a legitimate government pur-
pose, disagreed with the state court's interpretation of Agins. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022, 1026; 
Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899. The Supreme Court did not read the decision in Agins to suggest that 
the presence of a legitmate government purpose would render a regulation constitutional. See 
id. at 1026. Instead, the Supreme Court apparently interpreted Agins to mean only that the 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia affirmed the validity of the 
traditional, ad hoc inquiry conducted in other takings cases.223 He 
explained, however, that the Agins decision identified situations in 
which a court need not engage in a fact-specific inquiry but rather 
could categorically find that a taking had occurred.224 One such situ-
ation involves government action that does not substantially advance 
a legitimate government interest.226 This type of action constitutes a 
taking per se.226 The Lucas Court also indicated that ad hoc inquiries 
are unnecessary when the claim involves government action that 
destroys all economically beneficial or productive use of the property 
in question.227 This type of action also constitutes a taking per se.228 
The Supreme Court retreated from the broad implications of its 
second per se rule by creating an exception to its categorical effect.229 
Under this exception, government action that merely proscribes a use 
prohibited by background principles of nuisance or property law does 
not require compensation, even if it destroys all economically bene-
ficial and productive uses of the property.230 As the Court explained, 
a law or decree must do no more than duplicate the result that could 
have been achieved through the courtS.231 
Though various justices of the Lucas Court disagreed as to whether 
the plurality was voicing a new set of rules or merely applying exist-
ing doctrine,232 it seems clear that, after Lucas, a court could base its 
finding of an unconstitutional regulatory taking on anyone of three 
theories.233 Under the Lucas Court's reading of Agins, courts can find 
a per se violation of the Fifth Amendment if the challenged govern-
ment action does not advance legitimate government interests.234 
absence of a legitimate purpose would categorically render government action unconstitutional. 
See id. at 1016, 1022-23, 1026. 
223 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.B. 
224 See id. at 1015-16. 
226 See id. at 1015. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. at 1015-16. 
228 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. 
229 See id. at 1027~0. 
2110 See id. at 102~0. 
231 See id. at 1029. 
232 Compare id. at 1015-16 (Scalia indicating the categorical rule is not a new development) 
and id. at 1016 n.6. (same), with id. at 1036, 1043, 1045, 1046-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(cate-
gorical rule is significant departure from existing precedent) and id. at 1063--M (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
233 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16 (two categorical rules); id. at 1019 n.B. (traditional takings 
analysis). 
234 See id. at 1015. 
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Similarly, government action that goes beyond background principles 
of property law in denying an owner all economically beneficial uses 
of his or her land also constitutes unconstitutional takings per se.235 
Where government action destroys some, but not all, economically 
beneficial or productive uses, courts will employ the traditional tak-
ings considerations articulated in Penn Central to evaluate the tak-
ings claim.236 
D. Relevant Considerations in Evaluating tke Regulation's Effect 
Once a court determines that the challenged government action 
affects cognizable property interests, it must then determine the 
action's effect on those interests.237 In undertaking this second inquiry, 
courts typically measure the effect of the government action by con-
sidering both what was taken from the property as well as what 
remains in the property after the government action takes effect.238 
Courts focusing on the "residual rights" remaining in the property 
may assess these rights in economic terms, they may consider 
whether the residual rights allow the claimant to satisfy his or her 
reasonable investment backed expectations, or the focus on residual 
rights may be to ascertain whether the government action prevents 
the claimant from enjoying a "full bundle" of property rights.239 
Penn Central and Keystone provide examples of instances in which 
the Supreme Court considered residual rights in economic terms.240 
In Penn Central, the Court indicated that valuable residual property 
rights should be taken into account when assessing the impact of 
236 See id. at 1027, 1029---30. 
236 [d. at 1019 n.8 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)); 
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1109 (1995). In Lucas, Justice Scalia omits the character of the government action in his 
recital of the traditional takings analysis. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. His explicit reference 
to Penn Central, however, likely indicates that this factor is to be included in the analysis as 
well. See id.; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
237 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 430. 
238 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (test for regu-
latory takings requires comparison of value taken with value remaining); see Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 250, 262413 (1980); see also Henderer, supra note 121, at 429---34 (discussing 
various methods of evaluating regulation's effect). 
239 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (considering residual rights in economic terms and whether 
claimant retains full bundle of property rights despite regulation); Agins, 447 U.S. at 262413 
(considering whether residual rights allow claimant to satisfy IBE); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
136---37 (considering residual rights in economic terms and whether they allow claimant to satisfy 
IBE). 
240 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. 
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government action, even if the value of these rights may be insuf-
ficient to constitute just compensation if court concludes that a taking 
did indeed occur.241 Penn Central instructs courts to weigh the value 
of the remaining property rights against the adverse economic impact 
of the government action in an attempt to mitigate the "financial bur-
den" imposed by the challenged action.242 Keystone made the Court's 
focus on the economic aspects of a claimant's residual rights even 
more clear.243 In Keystone, the Supreme Court stated that its test for 
regulatory taking "required [it] to compare the value that has been 
taken from the property with the value that remains in the prop-
erty."244 
Some of the decisions outlined above also illustrate the Supreme 
Court's use of residual rights to determine the impact of government 
action on a claimant's investment-backed expectations.245 For exam-
ple, in addition to contemplating the claimant's residual rights in 
economic terms, the Penn Central Court also considered the residual 
property rights in concluding that the challenged ordinance did not 
impermissibly interfere with the claimant's primary expectation of 
using Grand Central Station as a railroad terminal.246 The Agins Court 
similarly relied upon the residual rights unaffected by the ordinance 
in explaining that the claimants were free to pursue their reasonable 
investment-backed expectations of developing the property for resi-
dential use.247 
Courts have also used residual rights to ascertain whether the 
government action prevents a claimant from enjoying a ''full bundle" 
of property rights.248 The imposition of a regulation will not amount to 
a taking if, despite the elimination of one use, the owner retains a "full 
bundle" of property rights when the property interests are viewed in 
the entirety.249 The Court in Keystone, for example, relied on earlier 
precedent indicating that the destruction of one "strand" in the ''bun-
dle of property rights" did not necessarily constitute a taking.260 
241 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. 
242 See id. 
243 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. 
244 [d. 
245 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 26~2 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
248 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
247 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262~3. 
248 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 6~ (1979). 
249 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 6~. 
250 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (citing Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66). 
1998] TRIBAL GAMING 891 
The focus on residual rights as a means to measure the government 
action's effect is consistent with the directives of other courts that 
have encouraged more than "formalistic inquiries" finding theoretical 
remaining uses.251 As the United States Claims Court explained in 
Florida Rock Industries v. United States, the application of a regula-
tion "invariably leaves the owner certain incidents of ownership that, 
on their face, appear significant."252 Courts must therefore examine 
the substance of what remains as a result of the regulation and not 
merely accept the "legal trappings" of a remaining use.253 If residual 
rights are hollow and important in theory only, they cannot bar a claim 
for compensation.254 Though much of the lower court's decision was 
ultimately vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the final reported decision in Florida Rock indicates 
that the Federal Circuit appears to agree with the lower court's 
requirement that residual rights must possess real, not just theoreti-
cal, value.255 The Federal Circuit seems to suggest that residual uses 
must be both available and economically realistic under the circum-
stances surrounding each case.256 
E. Summation of Regulatory Takings 
Regulatory takings jurisprudence has become very complex since 
its birth in Pennsylvania Coal. Several guiding principles, however, 
have emerged during its evolution. The Fifth Amendment does not 
protect every property interest.257 The first step in assessing takings 
claims therefore requires determination of whether the use affected 
by the regulation constitutes a cognizable property interest.258 Cogni-
251 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cm. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995). 
252 [d. 
253 See id. But see Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66 (claimants have not suffered a taking since, 
hypothetically, they could derive economic benefit from artifacts by displaying them and charg-
ing admission). 
254 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 166 (1980), vacated by 18 F.3d 
1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995) (portion of procedural history 
omitted). 
255 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
255 See id. In listing factors to consider in determining the economic effect of government 
action, the Federal Circuit included the query "are alternative permitted activities economically 
realistic in light of the setting and circumstances, and are they realistically available?" [d. 
257 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 414-15; Mandelker, supra note 124, at 228; see also Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States,444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124-25, 136 (1978). 
258 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 414. 
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zable property interests can be found in uses of property that are 
fundamental and essential to the definition of property.259 Interests 
that are sufficiently related to a property owner's primary reasonable 
investment-backed expectations regarding the use of the property 
may also constitute cognizable property interests.26o 
Once a court determines that the interests affected by the chal-
lenged regulation deserve Fifth Amendment protection, it must con-
sider the regulation and the magnitude of its effects.261 Regulations 
that do not substantially advance legitimate government interests 
constitute a taking per se.262 Regulations that eliminate all economi-
cally beneficial or productive uses are also subject to a categorical rule 
unless the use eliminated by the regulation is unlawful or did not 
inhere in the owner's original title.263 If a regulation does not qualify 
for either of these two per se rules, a court will then evaluate the claim 
using the traditional takings analysis of Penn Central.264 Though it 
may label its factors differently, courts consider the nature of the 
government action, the economic effect of the regulation, and the 
extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.265 
Courts assess the impact of a regulation largely by evaluating the 
residual rights remaining in the property after the government action 
takes effect.266 This prompts inquiries into the economic value of the 
property after the regulation takes effect,267 whether the residual 
rights allow the claimant to pursue his or her reasonable investment-
backed expectations,268 and whether the owner retains a full bundle 
of property rights after the regulation.269 At least some courts require 
that residual uses of the property in question actually have substance, 
259 See Hodel v. Christy, 481 U.S. 704, 715-17 (1989); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179. 
200 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
261 See Henderer, supra note 121 at 430. 
262 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (citing Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 438 U.S. 258, 260 (1980». 
263 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1030. 
264 See id. at 1019 n.8; Henderer supra note 121, at 416; see generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 
at 124-25. 
266 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-97 (1987); Agins, 
447 U.S. at 260--63; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
266 See generally Henderer, supra note 121, at 429--34. 
267 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. 
268 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262---ti3; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136--37 . 
. 269 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65---ti6 (1979). 
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rather than being "hollow" because of unavailability or economic im-
practicality.270 
III. REGULATORY TAKINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF TRIBAL GAMING 
A Fifth Amendment challenge brought by a hypothetical New Mex-
ico tribe engaged in gaming before the IGRA's enactment must go 
through each step of the takings analysis set out above.271 A court 
must first conclude that the state's refusal to negotiate affects cogni-
zable property interests.272 Second, the court must then determine 
that the state's refusal to negotiate so significantly affects these in-
terests that the state has in effect "taken" the property interests of 
the tribe and must provide just compensation.273 
A. Question One: Cognizable Property Interests 
1. Identifying the Affected Interest 
As a preliminary matter, the property alleged to be "taken" must 
first be identified. Though the tribe would undoubtedly stand a better 
chance of prevailing on a takings claim if it could define very narrowly 
the property affected by the state's action,274 the United States Su-
preme Court has "foreclose[d] reliance on ... legalistic distinctions 
within a bundle of property rights."275 Consequently, a court would 
likely reject attempts to confine the interests affected by the state's 
refusal to interests such as the tribe's use of the land for Class III 
gaming, or its property interests in equipment related to high-stakes 
gaming such as roulette wheels and blackjack tables.276 As an alterna-
tive, a tribe could allege (assuming the facts support the contention) 
that the state's action "takes" tribal property because it prevents the 
270 See Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cm. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995); Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 166 (1985) 
(procedural history omitted). 
271 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 416. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8, 1027 (1992). 
272 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; Henderer, supra note 121, at 414. 
273 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (if there is legitimate property 
interest, it cannot be taken without just compensation when the government exercises its 
regulatory power in manner that causes substantial devaluation of property). 
274 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 429. 
276 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987). 
276 See id.; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. 
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tribe from putting the property to its most profitable use-in this 
case, as a center for high-stakes gaming.277 
2. Application of Theory I 
A court most likely would assess the legitimacy of the tribe's prop-
erty interests in checklist fashion, beginning with the fundamental 
attributes approach of Theory I and moving to Theory II if neces-
sary.278 Courts readily recognize that "fundamental" property rights 
deserve constitutional protection.279 Once a court concludes that a 
government action affects an "essential element" of property, it must 
acknowledge the presence of a cognizable government interest.28o 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Andrus v. 
Allard suggests that the right to use one's property in the most 
profitable fashion would not qualify as a cognizable property interest 
under Theory 1.281 In Andrus, a dealer of Native American artifacts 
challenged the constitutionality of legislation that prohibited the sale, 
transfer, or purchase of items containing feathers of protected birds.282 
The claimant argued that the legislation "took" his property because 
it destroyed the most profitable use of the artifacts, namely, selling 
them.283 In evaluating the claimant's takings claim, the Court stated 
that the destruction of the most profitable use of a claimant's property 
is not dispositive to the resolution of the takings issue.284 This state-
ment indicates that the right to put property to its most profitable 
use does not qualify as a cognizable property interest under Theory 
I, since if this right were considered a "fundamental attribute" of 
property, the fact that government action impaired the right would 
indeed have been dispositive to the takings claim.285 
277 See generally Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.) (providing evidence that casinos are 
most profitable use); Baker, supra note 23, at HI. 
278 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979). In Andrus, the Court apparently rejected the 
notion that elimination of the most profitable use qualifies as a fundamental element of property. 
See id. ("not dispositive"). The fact that the Court then continues its takings analysis suggests 
it concluded elimination of the best use qualified as a cognizable property interest under Theory 
II. See infra notes 288-92 and accompanying text. 
279 See Hodel v. Christy, 481 U.S. 704, 715-17 (1989); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164,179-80 (1979). 
280 See Hodel, 481, U.S. at 716-17; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
281 See generally Andrus, 444 U.S. at 64. 
282 See id. at 53. 
283 See id. at 64. 
284 See id. 
286 See Hodel v. Christy, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1989); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 179-80 (1979). 
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3. Application of Theory II 
The tribe's right to put its property to the most profitable use may 
qualify as a cognizable property interest under Theory Il,286 Under 
Theory II, if the right to put the property to its most profitable use 
sufficiently relates to the primary investment-backed expectations of 
the tribe, the right may qualify for Fifth Amendment protection, 
provided that the tribe's expectations were reasonable.287 The opinion 
of the United States Supreme Court in Andrus provides some sup-
port for the argument that the right to put property to its most 
profitable use qualifies as a cognizable property interest under Theory 
11.286 
As noted above, the Andrus Court stated that although the chal-
lenged legislation eliminated the best use of the claimant's property, 
this point was "not dispositive."289 Yet the fact that the Court's evalu-
ation of the takings claim did not end with this statement supports 
the inference that the Court found the right to put property to its 
most profitable use cognizable for Fifth Amendment purposes under 
Theory Il,290 The Court never explicitly states this conclusion, but the 
inference is also supported by the Court's consideration of the prop-
erty's remaining uses.291 Inquiries as to the economic value of residual 
uses and whether the claimants retain a full bundle of property rights 
are questions a court would reach only after concluding that cogniza-
ble property interests are involved in the claim.292 
The Andrus Court ultimately concluded that no taking occurred on 
the facts of that case.293 Its treatment of the right involved in Andrus, 
however, leaves open the possibility that that a contrary conclusion 
could be reached on a different set of facts.294 If the facts of the 
hypothetical tribe's claim indicate that its right to put its property to 
the most profitable use sufficiently relates to its primary reasonable 
expectations concerning the use of the land, a court, based on what 
286 See Andrus, 481 U.S. at 66. 
287 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (sufficiently 
related to primary lEE); Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937--38 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (IBE 
must be reasonable). 
288 See Andrus, 481 U.S. at 66. 
289 See id. at 64. 
290 See id. at 67-68 (opinion continues); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
291 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67-68. 
292 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 414-16. 
293 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67-68. 
294 See supra notes 288-92, and accompanying text; see generally Andrus, 444 U.S. at 64-68. 
896 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:863 
appears to be implicit in Andrus, may find that a cognizable property 
interest is involved.295 
In considering the facts of the hypothetical tribe's case, it seems 
reasonable for a court to assume the tribe included high-stakes gam-
ing among its primary expectations.296 This assumption is supported 
by the ability of Class III casinos to generate huge revenues.297 The 
assumption receives further support from the fact that many tribes 
invested substantial amounts of capital exclusively to fund the devel-
opment of high-stakes gaming on their respective reservations.298 
If the court concludes that the tribe's interest in putting its prop-
erty to the most profitable use-gaming-is "sufficiently bound up 
with"299 the tribe's primary expectations regarding the use of the land, 
a court assessing the tribe's regulatory takings claim must next de-
termine whether the tribe's expectations were reasonable.3OO The rea-
sonableness of these expectations depends both on the lawfulness of 
the owner's intended use and the regulatory climate at the time of the 
investment.30l If the tribe's intended use of the property as a high-
stakes gaming facility violated federal or state law existing at the 
time it invested in the gaming facility, the unlawfulness of the in-
tended use renders the tribe's primary expectation unreasonable.302 
Similarly, if the circumstances at the time of the tribe's investment 
indicated that Class III gaming was or could be subject to govern-
ment control, this fact may render the tribe's expectations unreason-
able.303 
295 See supra notes 282-92, and accompanying text; see generally Andrus, 444 U.S. at 64-68. 
296 See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1550 n.6, (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 45 (1997) (providing evidence that high-stakes gaming was primary expectation of tribes 
involved in that case); Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.) (same); Baker, supra note 23, at 
HI (same); see generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
297 See Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.); Baker, supra note 23, at HI; 
298 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1550 n.6. 
299 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
300 See Mandelker, supra note 137, at 228; see generally Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 
937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
301 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) Oawfulness); 
Renderer, supra note 121, at 421, 427-28 (lawfulness and regulatory climate); Mandelker, supra 
note 124, at 233-36 (regulatory climate); see, e.g., Avenal, 103 F.3d at 937-38 (regulatory climate). 
302 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030; Henderer, supra note 121, at 421. 
303 See Mandelker, supra note 124, at 233-26; see, e.g., Avenal, 104 F.3d at 937-38. 
1998] TRIBAL GAMING 897 
a. Lawfulness of Intended Use 
Prior to the IGRA, the federal government possessed some degree 
of influence over tribal gaming.304 Though federal policy reflects the 
notion that Native American tribes are a sovereign people, subject 
only to the federal government,306 the unique trust relationship be-
tween tribes and the federal government confers on Congress plenary 
power over Indian affairs.306 Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted 
Title 25, Section 81 of the United States Code (Section 81).307 Section 
81 enables the federal government to approve or disapprove of any 
agreement between a non-Indian and an Indian tribe or individual 
Indian that involves payment or delivery of anything of value for 
services that relate to Indian land.308 Many federal courts applied 
Section 81 to agreements entered into for the management of tribal 
gaming operations.309 The determination of whether a particular man-
agement contract relates to Indian land is a fact-specific inquiry par-
ticular to each case.310 
While Section 81 vests considerable oversight powers in the federal 
government, it does not create a mechanism through which the fed-
eral government can directly control or prohibit the gaming con-
30!1 See generally 25 U.S.C.§ 81 (1994). 
305 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (quoting 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980), 
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975». 
306 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207. 
IW1 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 81. 
306 See id. 
309 See generally Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. American 
Management & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987); A.K. Management Co. v. San 
Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1986); Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Okla. 
1990); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1987); Shakopee Mdewakanon 
Sioux Community v. Pan American Management Co., 616 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Minn. 1985), dis-
missed on other grounds, 789 F.2d 632; Wisconsin Winnebago Business Committee v. Koberstein 
& Ho-Chunk Management, 762 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1985). 
310 See Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1993). Courts consider 
four factors in determining whether a particular is relative to Indian land. See id. at 807. First, 
the contract must relate to the management of a facility located on Indian lands. See id. Second, 
the contract must grant non-Indians the exclusive right to operate the facility. See id. Third, 
the contract must forbid the tribe from encumbering the property. See id. Lastly, the validity 
of the contract must depend upon the legal status of tribes as a separate sovereign in order for 
the Secretary's approval to be required. See id. Since most management contracts contain all of 
these elements in varying degree, Section 81 required Secretarial approval for the majority of 
these agreements. See 25 U.S.C. § 81; Shakopee, 616 F. Supp. at 1209. 
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ducted on a particular reservation.3ll Indeed, the parties typically did 
not even consider the presence or absence of federal approval of the 
management contract until one party sought to enforce the agree-
ment in a court proceeding.312 If the parties had failed to obtain federal 
approval, the extent of Section 81's penalty rendered the contract null 
and void.313 This may have indirectly impeded the operation of a 
particular gaming enterprise, but Section 81 did no more to affect the 
gaming in question.314 It did not criminalize or directly restrict the 
gaming activity solely because the parties failed to obtain proper 
approval.316 Tribal gaming thus would not have violated applicable 
federal law at the time the hypothetical New Mexico tribe invested 
in its gaming enterprise.316 
While Congress's plenary power over Indian Commerce made it 
possible, though unlikely, that the federal government would regulate 
Native American gaming, the sovereignty of Indian nations made it 
nearly impossible for states to impact tribal gaming.317 Native Ameri-
can sovereignty is subordinate to the federal government, not to the 
states.31S Consequently, states generally have no jurisdiction over In-
dian reservations.319 
Because states generally do not possess jurisdiction on tribal res-
ervations, state law applies to Native American affairs in very few 
instances.320 One such instance is if Congress expressly consents to 
the applicablity of state law.321 In the absence of congressional con-
sent, state law will apply only when state interests in a particular 
activity are high enough to avoid state law pre-emption and sufficient 
to warrant assertion of state authority.322 In order to determine when 
3ll See generally 25 U .S.C. § 81. 
312 See Green v. Menominee Tribe of Indians in Wisconsin, 47 Ct. Cl. 281, affd, 233 U.S. 558 
(1914). 
813 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 81. 
814 See generally id; Shakopee, 616 F. Supp. at 1209. 
816 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 81. 
816 See generally id. 
817 See Jones, BUpra note 20, at 129; see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987). 
818 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville 
Indians, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980». 
819 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207, 214-17; Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 
1288 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1996), em. denied, 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997). 
320 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207, 214-17; Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1288. 
821 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S at 207. 
822 [d. 480 U.S. at 216 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333-M 
(1983»; Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1288. 
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state interests are sufficient to justify applicability of state law, courts 
conduct a balancing test that pits state concerns against the interest 
of the federal government and the tribes in preventing state en-
croachment on tribal sovereignty.323 
In the context of Indian gaming, states failed to persuade the courts 
that Congress consented to the applicability of state law.324 In Cali-
fornia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the United States Su-
preme Court rejected the state's argument that Congress had con-
sented to state regulation of Indian gaming by enacting Public Law 
280.326 The Court agreed that Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 
response to concerns about lawlessness on Indian reservations,326 but 
relied on its earlier decision in Bryan v. Itasca County to interpret 
Public Law 280 as granting broad criminal jurisdiction to the states, 
but only limited civil jurisdiction.327 Public Law 280 did not grant the 
states general civil regulatory authority.328 
Because a state's regulatory authority depends on the nature of the 
state law in question, a court must determine whether state gaming 
law is criminal or civil in nature.329 The Cabazon Band Court approved 
a test that distinguished between state "criminal/prohibitory" laws 
and state "civil/regulatory" laws.330 Under this test, a state law is 
criminal if its intent is to generally prohibit certain conduct.331 If state 
323 See generally Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207-09. 
324 See generally id. 
326 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207. See Hyde, supra note 2, at 667-70; see generally 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1162 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994). The state also claimed that the Organinzed Crime Control 
Act (18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994» conveyed congressional consent to the applicability of state law. 
See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 212-14. This argument was rejected for three reasons: (1) the 
OCCA defines federal crimes, there is nothing in the Act indicating that the states are to have 
any part in enforcing federal criminal laws; (2) the Court rejected the proposition that states 
might be authorized to make arrests on reservations that, in the absence ofthe OCCA, it could 
not effect; (3) no exigent circumstances exist which would warrant state officers' intervention 
since unlawful gaming is not the type of situation where the unavailability of a federal officer 
would result in non-enforcement. See id. at 213-14. Because the argument was rejected by the 
Court and is not fact-specific, this avenue seems to be permanently closed as a means of arguing 
congressional consent. For this reason, this Comment does not discuss the argument in detail. 
328 Id. at 207; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1976). 
327 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208; see Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385, 388--90; Hyde, supra note 79, 
at 669-70. 
328 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208; see Bryan, 426 U.S. at 385, 388--90. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the holding in Bryan, reasoning that a grant to States of general civil regulatory power 
over Indian reservations would result in the destruction of tribal institutions and values. See 
Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208. 
329 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208. 
8llO See id. at 209-10. 
331Id. at 209. 
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law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it is 
civil in nature and Public Law 280 does not authorize its enforcement 
on the reservation.332 Cabazon Band signified that tribes residing in 
states that generally prohibited gaming but allowed a few limited 
exceptions could establish gaming enterprises and remain free from 
state interference.333 After Cabazon Band, states could not apply their 
laws to Native American gaming operations conducted within their 
borders unless state law completely prohibited all forms of gaming.334 
The Cabazon Band Court also considered the argument that state 
interests in the context of tribal gaming were sufficiently high to 
warrant the applicability of state law.335 In balancing the relevant in-
terests involved in Native American affairs, the Court noted the fed-
eral government's express endorsements of tribal gaming and placed 
significant weight on the pro-gaming interests of the federal govern-
ment and the tribe.336 In assessing the state's interest, the Court 
rejected California's claim that its interest in preventing the infiltra-
tion of organized crime outweighed the pre-emptive force of the fed-
eral and tribal interests apparent in the case.337 
Applying the principles of Cabazon Band to the situation of the 
hypothetical New Mexico tribe, it appears that New Mexico law did 
not apply to gaming conducted on Native American reservations 
when the tribe opened its casino in 1987.338 At that time, New Mexico 
law generally made gaming illegal, subject to exception.339 "Las Vegas 
Nights" constituted such an exception.340 Las Vegas Nights allowed 
charities to raise money for various causes at limited times during the 
year.341 Under the Supreme Court's holding in Cabazon Band, New 
Mexico's allowance of gaming in even these limited instances renders 
New Mexico's gambling laws permissive in nature and thus inappli-
cable to the tribe.342 Because state law did not apply to Native Ameri-
3:l2Id. 
333 See Jones, supra note 20, at 132. 
334 Id. 
335 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 214-15. 
336 See id. at 216-18. 
337 Id. at 220-21, 222. A major flaw in the state's argument seemed to be its lack of concern 
for off-reservation bingo and lotteries, which the state permitted. See id. at 221. 
338 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-19-1 to 15 (Michie 1978); Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 
281, 283 (N.M. 1995) (with limited, exceptions, gambling is a crime in New Mexico); see also 
Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207-09. 
339 See N.M. STAT. ANN. 30-19-1 to 15; Citation Bingo, 910 P.2d at 283. 
340 See Citation Bingo, 910 P.2d at 283-84. 
341 See id. 
342 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 208-09. 
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can gaming operations at the time the tribe made its investment in 
the property, the tribe's intended use of its property could not have 
violated any provision of state law.343 
b. The Regulatory Climate 
Courts limit takings recoveries to "owners who could demonstrate 
that they bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs that 
did not include the challenged regulatory scheme.''344 Due to this 
limitation, circumstances that existed at the time of the tribe's invest-
ment-such as a low purchase price or the requirement of a permit 
for development or construction-indicating that Class III gaming 
could be subject to government control may render unreasonable the 
tribe's primary investment-backed expectation of conducting high-
stakes gaming.345 A court will therefore undertake an inquiry into the 
regulatory climate existing at the time of the tribe's investment.346 For 
the purposes of this hypothetical, this Comment will assume the tribe 
purchased the property at a reasonable price that did not discount for 
regulatory risk. 
The previous discussion illustrated that Section 81 did not present 
an impediment to tribes opening the doors of their casinos.347 Section 
81 granted the federal government the ability to influence, not control, 
Indian gaming.348 The failure of Section 81 to provide the federal 
government with the ability to control tribal gaming counsels against 
a finding that the circumstances existing at the time of the tribe's 
investment indicated the existence of significant regulatory risk.349 
Additionally, while it is true that Congress's plenary power over 
Indian affairs suggests that the federal government could, at any 
time, have subjected Native American gaming to regulation, the fact 
that federal policy openly favored gaming minimized the likelihood of 
343 See id; Citation Bingo, 910 P.2d at 283. In 1995, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared 
"Las Vegas nights" unlawful, implying that until 1995, Las Vegas nights were presumed lawful. 
See Citation Bingo, 910 P.2d at 283. Whether such nights were indeed lawful need not be 
explored, however, since the language of the state court admits that some forms of gaming are 
still legal in New Mexico. See id. (''with limited exceptions, gambling is a crime in New Mexico"). 
The existence of any exception, regardless of its narrowness, renders state law permissible in 
nature and inapplicable on Indian lands. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 209-11. 
344 Loveladies Rarbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
345 See Mandelker, supra note 124, at 233-36. 
346 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 426-28. 
347 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994). 
348 See generally id. 
349 See Renderer, supra note 121, at 426-28; Mandelker, supra note 124, at 233-a6. 
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anti-gaming legislation being enacted.360 In the face of budget cuts 
designed to slow the growth of an increasing deficit, the federal gov-
ernment saw tribal gaming as a potential substitute for federal 
funds.361 By 1987, the Secretary of the Interior, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Affairs, and the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services had taken steps to ensure that tribes could finance 
gaming enterprises.362 Given the strong support the federal govern-
ment expressed for Indian gaming, the hypothetical tribe's reliance 
on the federal regulatory state of affairs does not appear unreason-
able.363 
The tribe's reliance on the continuity of New Mexico's regulatory 
scheme also appears reasonable under the circumstances existing at 
the time the tribe invested in its gaming facility.364 As previously 
noted, in the absence of Congressional consent, Cabazon Band made 
state law applicable to tribal lands only if it was criminal in nature.366 
Consequently, New Mexico could affect gaming on tribal lands within 
the state only if it enacted legislation completely banning gaming in 
any and all circumstances.366 The fact that the state still has not 
enacted an absolute ban on gambling, but instead allows "limited 
exceptions" to its general prohibition affirms the reasonableness of 
the hypothetical tribe's reliance on a similar state of affairs.367 
4. Summation of Question One 
The success of the tribe's regulatory takings action depends, in 
part, on its ability to demonstrate that its claim involves cognizable 
property interests.368 For this reason, the tribe should argue that its 
property has been taken by the state because the state's refusal to 
360 See DiGregory Statement, supra note 31 (page unavail.); Bee alBo California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1987) (discussing federal approval of ganting). 
361 See DiGregory Statement, supra note 31 (page unavail.); Bee alBo Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 
at 217-18. 
362 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 218 (citing S. Rep. No. 99-493, at 5 (1986». 
363 Compare Avenal v. United States, 104 F.3d 933, 934--35 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (circumstances 
indicated impending government action), with Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 
1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (no circumstances indicating impending government action). 
364 See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207--00; Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 283 
(N.M.1995). 
366 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 207~9. 
366 See id. 
367 See Citation Bingo, 910 P.2d at 283. 
366 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 414-15; Bee also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
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negotiate the tribal-state compact in good faith prevents the tribe 
from putting its property to its most profitable use.369 The right to use 
one's property in the most profitable manner is unlikely to qualify as 
a cognizable property interest under the fundamental attributes the-
ory,360 but may, however, qualify for constitutional protection under 
Theory 11.361 
To determine whether Theory II renders the tribe's right to put its 
property to the most profitable use worthy of constitutional protec-
tion, a court must conclude that this right sufficiently relates to the 
tribe's primary expectation regarding the use of the land, and that 
these expectations were reasonable.362 Because high-stakes gaming is 
the most lucrative form of gaming, and because so many tribes dedi-
cate scarce financial resources to fund the development of gaming 
activities, the hypothetical tribe can likely convince a court that the 
most profitable use of its property-high-stakes gaming-was 
"sufficiently bound up with"363 the tribe's primary expectations when 
it invested in the gaming enterprise.3M 
Having concluded that the tribe's interest sufficiently relates to a 
primary expectation, a court must then look to the lawfulness of the 
use and the regulatory climate that existed at the time of the tribe's 
investment to evaluate the reasonableness of the hypothetical tribe's 
expectations.365 Since no federal law criminalized tribal gaming and 
New Mexico state law did not apply to Native American gaming 
conducted on tribal reservations, the tribe could lawfully use the 
property as a high-stakes gaming facility.3OO Further, circumstances 
existing at the time of the tribe's investment indicated a minimal risk 
359 See generally Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); supra notes 288-92 and accom-
panying text. 
360 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 64; see also Hodel v. Christy, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1981); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
361 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67; see also supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text. 
362 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Avenal v. United 
States, 100 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Mandelker, supra note 124, at 232. 
363 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25; Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1550 n.6, 
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 45 (1997); Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Baker, supra note 23, HI. 
364 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1550 n.6 (providing evidence that casinos are most 
profitable use); Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.) (same); Baker, supra note 23, at HI 
(same); see generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
366 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); Henderer, supra 
note 121, at 421, 427-28; Mandelker, supra note 124, at 233-36; see, e.g., Avenal, 103 F.3d at 
937-38. 
366 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994); Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 283-84 (N.M. 
1995). 
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of federal regulation,367 and supported the tribe's reliance on New 
Mexico's continued exceptions to gaming prohibitions (rendering its 
gaming laws permissive and thus inapplicable).368 Because the tribe's 
primary expectations entailed a lawful use of its property and circum-
stances at the time of the investment indicated little to no regulatory 
risk, the tribe's investment-backed expectations appear reasonable.369 
Because the tribe's intentions of operating a high-stakes gaming 
casino (the most profitable use of its property) sufficiently relate to 
the tribe's reasonable investment-backed expectations a court could 
properly find that the tribe's regulatory takings claim involves cogni-
zable property interests.37o 
B. Question Two: The State's Refusal and Its Effects 
Having concluded that the tribe's right to put its property to its 
most profitable use constitutes a cognizable property interest, a court 
next must determine whether the effect of New Mexico's refusal to 
negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith rises to the level of a 
taking.371 A court would first consider the applicability of Lucas's rules 
rendering government action unconstitutional per se if it does not 
substantially advance legitimate public purposes or if it denies all 
economically beneficial use of the property that was not otherwise 
prohibited by common law nuisance principles.372 If neither of the 
categorical rules apply to the hypothetical tribe's situation, a court 
would then evaluate the effect of the state's refusal using the tradi-
tional takings analysis of Penn Central.373 
1. Applicability of Categorical Rules 
Since state action that does not advance a legitimate government 
purpose is unconstitutional per se, a court evaluating the takings claim 
of a hypothetical tribe from New Mexico must assess the motives 
367 See DiGregory Statement, supra note 31 (page unavail.) (discussing federal approval of 
gaming); see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1987) 
(same). 
368 See Citation Bingo, 910 P.2d at 283--84. 
869 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 415, 427-28. 
370 See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
871 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 416, 429. 
372 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16, 1029-30 (1992); 
Henderer, supra note 121, at 430-31. 
• 873 Henderer, supra note 121, at 431; see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. 
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behind the state's refusal to negotiate.374 Because state opposition is 
typically a manifestation of the public's fears regarding the infiltration 
of organized crime and potential deleterious effects on morals of the 
neighboring communities, New Mexico's refusal to negotiate a com-
pact can reasonably be said to further a public purpose.375 Statements 
made by various New Mexico legislators support the contention that 
the state's actions further a public purpose by enforcing the pub-
lic's opposition to tribal gaming.376 The state's action therefore cannot 
be rendered unconstitutional under the first of Lucas's categorical 
rules.377 
A court assessing the hypothetical tribe's regulatory takings chal-
lenge would then consider whether the second categorical rule articu-
lated in Lucas applies.378 New Mexico's refusal to negotiate with the 
tribe will violate the Fifth Amendment if it destroys all economically 
beneficial or productive use of the tribe's property.379 The situation is 
unlikely to be one in which a court would find that a "total taking" of 
the property has occurred.380 Even the Lucas Court acknowledged the 
rarity of total takings situations.38! In this instance, the fact that the 
property is still available for other economically beneficial uses pre-
cludes the tribe from seriously contending that the state's refusal to 
negotiate a compact renders its property entirely worthless.382 
2. Traditional Takings Analysis 
Having concluded that neither of the Lucas rules apply in the 
tribe's case, a court would next use the traditional takings analysis of 
Penn Central to consider the effect of the state's refusal to negotiate 
a tribal-state compact.383 This test examines the nature ofthe govern-
ment action, the economic impact of the action, and the extent to 
374 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. 
376 See Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.); Griego, supra note 
2, at 8A. 
376 See Holt, supra note 2, at 43A. 
377 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. 
378 See id. 
379 See id. 
380 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 424. 
381 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. 
382 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1987) (because 
the company could still make a profit on coal, it could not argue regulation denied all economi-
cally viable use). 
383 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8; Henderer, supra note 121, at 431; see generally Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1978). 
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which the government action interferes with the claimant's reason-
able primary investment-backed expectations.384 Having previously 
determined that New Mexico's refusal to negotiate likely results from 
the public's concerns about the infiltration of organized crime and the 
negative effect the casino might have on surrounding communities, a 
court would easily dispense with the first criterion, finding the nature 
of the government action acceptable since it advances a legitimate 
public purpose.385 
In considering the second factor in the Penn Central test, a court 
will evaluate what has been taken from the property in light of what 
remains in the property after the state's refusal to negotiate.386 In 
assessing the residual uses remaining in the property, a court may 
consider their economic value, it may inquire as to whether the resid-
ual uses allow the claimant to satisfy his or her reasonable IBE, and/or 
a court may inquire as to whether the owner retains a full bundle of 
property rights despite the government action.387 
Viewing the residual uses from an economic vantage point, the fact 
that the state's refusal eliminates the most profitable use of the prop-
erty may weigh in the tribe's favor.388 Yet although this fact is sig-
nificant, courts have refused to allow the denial of the "highest and 
best economic use," standing alone, to constitute a compensable tak-
ing.389 The availability of compensation for the hypothetical tribe de-
pends on the court's assessment of the alternative uses of the prop-
erty. This assessment will in turn depend upon the degree of scrutiny 
with which the court hearing the tribe's case views the residual uses 
of the property.390 
For instance, if the court assessing the tribe's takings claim adopts 
the perspectives of the United States Supreme Court in Andrus v. 
Allard, the court will likely conclude that the state's refusal to nego-
384 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124--25. 
385 See id.; Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.); Griego, supra 
note 2, at 8A. 
386 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. 
387 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-{i3 (1980); Penn 
Central,438 U.S. at 136--37. 
388 See generally Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
389 See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Henderer, supra 
note 121, at 430. 
390 Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding taking 
despite valuable residual uses) and Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995) (implying residual uses must be available 
and economically realistic), with Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-{i7 (finding no taking despite residual 
uses of questionable value). 
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tiate a compact does not rise to the level of a taking.391 In Andrus, the 
Court based its conclusion that no taking occurred largely on the fact 
that the claimant retained the right to possess, transport, donate and 
devise the property.392 For the Andrus Court, the fact that the claim-
ant retained a full bundle of property rights despite the regulation 
apparently countered the fact that the economic value of the prop-
erty's residual uses was questionable.393 The Court did not even con-
sider the impact of the challenged legislation on the claimant's invest-
ment backed expectations.394 If the court assessing the regulatory 
claim of the hypothetical tribe adopts the strict approach taken in 
Andrus, the tribe's chances of success appear very slim since the tribe 
not only retains the right to possess, donate and devise the property, 
but also the right to sell the property or use it for other purposes.395 
The Supreme Court decided Andrus in 1979.396 Subsequent cases 
may indicate that courts no longer follow such a strict approach in 
assessing the effect of the government's action on the claimant's prop-
erty interests.397 In Lucas, for example, the claimant retained the 
right to possess, donate, and devise his property as well as the right 
to sell the land, yet the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that the effect of the government action not only rose to the level of 
a taking, but inspired a categorical rule.398 In direct contrast to An-
drus, the Lucas Court apparently concluded that the claimant's re-
tention of a full bundle of property rights was not sufficient to 
counter the economic effects of the regulation.399 Perhaps the Lucas 
decision suggests that the Supreme Court favors the approach of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which seems 
to require residual uses that are both available and economically 
realistic.4°O 
391 See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 664i7. 
392 See id. at 66. 
393 See id. at 654i6. 
394 See generally id. 
395 See id. 
396 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 51. 
397 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. v. United States 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 18 F.3d 1560 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995). 
398 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. The Court noted that it accepted as true the state court's 
finding that the legislation rendered the claimant's property valueless. Assuming, arguendo, 
that the property had no value and could not be sold, a strict application of Andrus would still 
force the Lucas Court to conclude that no taking had occurred since the claimants in both cases 
retained similar residual rights. Compare id. at lOO7"'{)8 with Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. 
399 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016. 
400 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
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Though it cannot be said definitively that courts now require resid-
ual rights of more substance than those that satisfied the Supreme 
Court in Andrus, if such a trend does exist it would serve to 
strengthen the regulatory takings claim of the hypothetical New 
Mexico tribe. A court would have difficulty finding a residual use of 
the property that is of comparable value to that of high-stakes gam-
ing.401 The particular circumstances of the case may prompt a court to 
conclude that alternative uses are neither available nor realistic.402 
For instance, a tribe that built a hotel-casino complex may retain the 
right to use the property as a hotel if the state refuses to negotiate a 
tribal-state compact, but a court could reasonably conclude that such 
a residual use is economically unrealistic if the prohibition on high-
stakes gaming removes the major or only attraction to the tribe's 
reservation. In short, though the facts of each case would determine 
the effect of the state's action on the tribe's property, recent cases 
indicate a court may properly find that this factor of the traditional 
takings inquiry tips the balance in favor of the tribe.403 
Lastly, a court hearing the regulatory takings claim of the hypo-
thetical tribe must also assess the degree to which New Mexico's 
refusal to negotiate a tribal-state compact interferes with the tribe's 
investment-backed expectations.404 This Section previously demon-
strated the reasonableness of the tribe's expectation to operate a 
gaming facility on the property.405 Due to the unique ability of Class 
III games to draw considerable business, it is most likely that the 
tribe considered high-stakes gaming an essential feature of its gaming 
enterprise.406 In prohibiting the operation of high-stakes gaming by 
refusing to negotiate the required compact, New Mexico significantly 
interferes with what must be regarded as the tribe's primary expec-
tation regarding the use of its property, possibly frustrating these 
expectations entirely.407 The third factor of the Penn Central analysis 
thus also weighs in favor of the tribe's takings claim. 
401 See Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.); Griego, supra note 
2, at 8A. 
402 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
403 See generally id. 
404 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 104, 124--25 (1978). 
405 See supra notes 300-57 and accompanying text. 
406 See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1550 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 45 (1997); Jacobson, supra note 98 (page unavail.); Baker, supra note 23, at HI. 
407 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-37; Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1550 n.6; Jacobson, 
supra note 98 (page unavail.); Baker, supra note 23, at HI. 
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Because any analysis under the traditional takings analysis is very 
fact-specific, a court hearing the tribe's takings claim must look with 
scrutiny at the value of the residual uses and the impact that the 
state's action has on the investment-backed expectations of the 
tribe.408 In theory, however, the potential weight of the factors in the 
takings analysis indicate that a court evaluating a Fifth Amendment 
challenge brought by aNew Mexico tribe that became involved in 
high stakes gaming prior to the IGRA's enactment could properly find 
that the state's refusal to negotiate a compact in good faith, consti-
tutes a compensable taking. 
C. An Analogy 
An apt analogy helps demonstrate an approach that a court may 
apply to a regulatory takings claim asserted by a tribe involved in 
gaming pre-IGRA.409 The situation of tribes involved in gaming prior 
to the enactment of the IGRA is remarkably similar to problems 
involving wetlands regulation under the Clean Water Act.410 In both 
situations, federal legislation establishes a regulatory framework that 
grants ultimate veto power to another governmental entity.411 In the 
context of wetland protection, Congress created this arrangement by 
granting the Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction and the authority 
to prohibit or permit particular uses of property.412 In Indian gaming, 
this arrangement is a result of the requirements of the Gaming Act 
and the Supreme Court's decision vesting permit-like power in the 
states.413 In either scenario, upon denial of a "permit," the claimant 
brings an action against the "issuing" entity.414 
408 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (ad hoc inquiries). 
409 See generally Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Cl. Ct 1981); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. 
Ct. 332 (1992); Henderer, supra note 121, at 424-34. 
410 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 424-34 (discussion of property owners who had purchased 
before challenged regulation was enacted). 
4ll Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994) (compact is required), Pueblo of Santa Ana v. 
Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1297 (D.N.M. 1996), afl'd, 104 F.3d 1546 (lOth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 45 (l997) (Seminole Tribe grants veto power to states) and Panel, supra note 13 (page 
unavail.) (same), with Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) and Henderer, supra note 
121, at 411, 424-25 (description of regulatory framework under Clean Water Act). 
412 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); see also Henderer, supra note 121, at 411, 424-25. 
418 See 25 U.S.C. 271O(d)(1)(C); Seminole 'Iiibe of Indians v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996); 
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp at 1297. 
414 See Henderer, supra note 121, at 424-28. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 
28 F.3d 1171, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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Wetlands' owners who invested in their property and developed 
their expectations in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include 
the government's ability to deny the claimant an expected use of 
the property have often prevailed in Fifth Amendment challenges.416 
Courts have found that when the Corps' denies such an owner a 
permit to use the wetlands in a manner that previously did not require 
the Corps' consent, the denial constitutes a taking.416 Similar success 
may be realized by Indian tribes that opened high-stakes gambling 
casinos before Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The plight and poverty of Native Americans is well documented.417 
One observer likened Native American communities to Third World 
countries operating within state borders.418 In New Mexico, nearly 
half ofthe state's Indians live below the poverty level.419 Even in 1996, 
one quarter of New Mexico Indians lived in homes without plumb-
ing.420 Unemployment rates as high as twenty-five percent stifled 
hopes of a better life.421 
Many believe that the operation of high-stakes gaming casinos on 
tribal lands changed this situation for the better.422 Some saw casinos 
as an opportunity for tribes to "dramatically improve the lives of 
their mem-bers and to experience the financial independence and se-
curity of true sovereigns."423 During the period in which the tribes of-
fered high-stakes gaming, revenue from casinos allowed many Native 
Americans to accomplish community, political, and individual goals.424 
Tribal casinos also elevated the standard of living for many individu-
416 See generally Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1183; Formanek v. United States, 26 CI. Ct 332 
(1992). 
416 See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1177, 1179; Formanek, 26 CI. Ct. at 333, 340-41. 
417 See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 2, at 665--66; Holt, supra note 2, at 43A; Griego, supra note 2, 
at 8A; Florio, supra note 2, at All. 
418 Florio, 8Upra note 2, at All. 
4191d. 
420 ld. 
421 See Hyde, supra note 2, at 666; Griego, supra note 2, at 8A; Florio, supra note 2, at All 
(16% unemployment rate at the Pojoaque Pueblo). 
422 See Holt, supra note 2, 43A; Griego, supra note 2, at 8A. 
423 Holt, supra note 2, at 43A (quoting United States district court judge). 
424 See id.; Baker, supra note 23, at H1; Griego, 8upra note 2, at 8A; Florio, supra note 2, at 
All. 'Iiibes have used casino revenues to construct health and community centers, finance fire 
departments, fund alcohol rehabilitation programs, and provide money for schools and scholar-
ship funds. See Holt, supra note 2, at 43A. Casinos revenue has also supported lobbying efforts 
for tribal interests and has been used for campaign contributions to candidates sympathetic to 
Native American issues. See id.; Griego, 8Upra note 2, at 8A. 
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als.426 Revenue from casinos has become such a life-blood that tribe 
after tribe is "hailing gambling as the new buffalo."426 
Like its predecessor, this new buffalo is under attack.427 The com-
bination of the tribal-state compact requirement and the recent deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe seriously threatens the continued ability of 
Native American tribes to conduct high-stakes gaming activity on 
their respective reservations.428 After Seminole Tribe, a state can 
criminalize the operation of Class III gaming enterprises by simply 
ignoring its federally created obligation to negotiate a compact in 
good faith.429 
Tribes that began high-stakes gaming enterprises prior to the ef-
fective date of the IGRA suffer not only a significant loss in future 
income, but an enormous reduction in present property value when a 
state refuses to negotiate.430 This Comment suggests that an analysis 
of the current standards applied in regulatory takings jurisprudence 
indicates the potential for tribes in this situation to successfully con-
tend that the refusal of their respective state to negotiate a gaming 
compact unconstitutionally takes tribal property without just com-
pensation.431 Though the resolution of each case would be highly fact 
specific, the Fifth Amendment may provide a means through which 
Native American tribes can protect their latest buffalo. 
425 See Holt, 8Upra note 2, at 43A. Unemployment rates have dropped in New Mexico where 
eleven casinos employed as many as 4,275 people, both Indian and non-Indian. See id.; Florio, 
supra note 2, at All. In 1996, the New Mexico Tax and Revenue Department estimated that 
nearly $400 million would be spent in Indian casinos. Baker, 8Upra note 23, at Hl. One ganling 
association study reported that these casinos provided tribes with an estimated $262 million and 
promised to provide New Mexico with as much as thirteen million dollars in fees to the state. 
Holt, 8Upra note 2, at 43A. Estimates for 1995 include an income figure of $230 million. Baker, 
supra note 23, at Hl. New Mexico officials are not accepting the $13 million in fees agreed upon 
in various Tribal-State compacts until litigation involving the compacts concludes. Holt, supra 
note 2, at 43. 
426 Griego, supra note 2, at 8A. 
427 See id. 
428 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (requirements); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Floria, 116 S. Ct. 
44, 76 (1996) (11th Amendment bars suits against state, Ex Parte Young not available); Pueblo 
of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1297-98 (D.N.M. 1996), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 
1996), em. denied., 118 S. Ct. 45 (1997) (tribes have no recourse against states); Panel supra, 
note 13, at 26A (Seminole Tribe essentially gives states veto power over Indian gambling). 
429 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C); Pueblo of Santa Ana, 932 F. Supp. at 1297-98; Panel, supra 
note 13, at 26A. 
430 See Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1550 n.6. 
431 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16, 1030 (1992); Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendictus, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255,262 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1978); 
Avenal v. United States, 104 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
